Abhit Bhandari

Able and Mostly Willing: An Empirical Anatomy of Information's Effect on Voter-Driven Accountability in Senegal (with Horacio Larreguy and John Marshall). 2023. American Journal of Political Science 67(4):1040-1066.

Political accountability may be constrained by the reach and relevance of information campaigns in developing democracies and—upon receiving information—voters’ ability and will to hold politicians to account. To illuminate voter-level constraints in the absence of dissemination problems, we conducted a field experiment around Senegal’s 2017 parliamentary elections to examine the core theoretical steps linking the personal delivery and explanation of different types of incumbent performance information to electoral and non-electoral accountability. We provide evidence that voters are able and mostly willing to use relevant information to support political accountability. [Download paper]

Social, Formal, and Political Determinants of Trade Under Weak Rule of Law: Experimental Evidence from Senegalese Firms. 2023. Comparative Political Studies 56(2):163-192.

In environments where contracting is insecure and dependent on political influence, how do firms ensure secure exchange? Firms may use social, formal, or political heuristics when selecting business partners, but how these factors jointly impact exchange remains understudied. I administered an original survey and conjoint experiment to approximately 2,400 firms in the formal and informal sector in Senegal. The results demonstrate support for all three theories: To varying degrees, social, state, and political factors simultaneously impact firms’ sense of deal security and likelihood of exchange. [Download paper]

Political Determinants of Economic Exchange: Evidence from a Business Experiment in Senegal. 2022. American Journal of Political Science 66(4):835-852.

Economic growth requires confidence in the secure exchange of goods. But when states selectively enforce rule of law, political considerations can moderate the trust that buyers have in sellers. This paper proposes a theory of seller moral hazard in exchange and tests it in an environment with real economic stakes: I created and operated a business in Senegal and hired employees to conduct door-to-door sales. In a field experiment, I randomized whether my employees signaled their political connections and/or offered formal contracts as part of the deal. Results show that unequal political connections impede trade and that formal contracts are only useful for powerful buyers. Exchange under these conditions can result in distinct trading networks that intensify inequalities. [Download paper]

Covered in: [World Bank Development Impact Blog] [An Africanist Perspective] [Financial Access Initiative] [Jain Family Institute]

Nation-State or Nation-Family? Nationalism in Marginalized African Societies (with Lisa Mueller). 2019. Journal of Modern African Studies 57(2):297-322.

Why is nationalism so strong in areas where the state is virtually absent? We leverage a contemporary border change in the neglected Niger-Burkina Faso border area to illuminate a theory of familial nationalism. To test this theory, we conducted a survey of citizens, chiefs, and state officials in the borderlands, as well as focus groups in the capital cities of the two countries. Contrary to the extant literature, we find that sentiments of nationalism are a function of hereditary ties and local familial power structures, rather than an instrument to access state goods. [Journal link] [Ungated preprint]

Covered in: [The Washington Post's Monkey Cage]

Connections, Gender, and Access to State-Facilitated Private-Sector Development: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Senegal.

In developing countries, access to opportunities within the private sector are often unequally distributed. Disproportionate advantages may accrue to those with connections to the state or to those with higher social standing. In this paper, I causally estimate the impact of political and social determinants of access to private-sector development under unevenly enforced rule of law. I do so by implementing a field experiment in Senegal in which I operate a registered business and randomize political partisanship and gender during entrepreneurs' applications for valuable business permits at municipal councils. I find that co-partisan applicants deal with fewer steps in the application process and are more likely to successfully deposit an application. Women, by contrast, are more likely to have their applications rejected, despite following the same procedures as men. These results highlight the specific steps along the institutional pathway where political and social connections are most influential, and offer causal evidence to inform policy to reduce the barriers facing entrepreneurs in developing countries.

Private-Sector Support for Programmatic Candidates: Evidence from Senegal (with Jessica Gottlieb).

Private-sector actors in developing countries often value clientelistic policies, which can deepen existing inequalities and market segmentation. Under what conditions will business owners vote for programmatic candidates that campaign on impersonal, universalistic policies instead of more particularistic ones? We argue that firm formality plays a critical role in moderating support for clientelistic candidates. Formal firms, facing complex local political pressures, are more likely to support programmatic candidates, and informal firms who believe they might formalize similarly break away from the cycle of clientelism. Using evidence from a survey on political connections and an embedded information experiment conducted with firm owners in the formal and informal sectors ahead of Senegal's local elections in 2022, we demonstrate the conditions under which workers prefer programmatic candidates.

Political Connections, Patronage, and Consumer Attitudes: Evidence from Morocco (with Erin York).

Clientelism alters citizens’ behavior as voters, but can it also impact citizens as consumers? We argue that despite voting for politicians who offer targeted goods, citizens abstain from financial transactions with these politicians in the future. Clientelistic politicians, by demonstrating their willingness to bend rules in the electoral process, lead consumers to believe they will also be untrustworthy in a transactional environment. We test this theory using evidence from a conjoint experiment in Morocco, a country where politicians often have one foot in the private sector. The results demonstrate the linkages between patronage networks and consumer behavior in contexts characterized by clientelism and suggest that political support does not necessarily translate to economic support.

Firm Strategies, Weak Rule of Law: Property Rights, Forum Shopping, and Contract Enforcement in Developing Countries.

How do firms secure their property rights when deals are broken in societies with weak rule of law? I administered a survey with an embedded experiment to formal and informal firms in Senegal. Firm managers stated their likelihood of using various legal and social enforcement strategies when a business partner reneged on a randomized formal or informal contract. The survey results provide needed descriptive evidence of formal and informal firms’ divergent strategies for protecting property rights, and experimental evidence that formal contracts increase dependence on legal institutions—and decrease dependence on social institutions—for property rights security.

The Political Nature of Entrepreneurship in Developing Countries: Experimental Evidence from Tunisia and Senegal (with Robert Kubinec, Sekou Jabateh, and Hamza Mighri).

Substituting For Rule of Law: Bilateral Investment Treaties and U.S. Firms' Investment in Developing Countries (with Joonseok Yang). Revise and resubmit.

Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) can encourage foreign investment in developing countries, but may also have unintentional political consequences. We argue that by enabling investment in weak institutional contexts, BITs substitute for judicial institutions in attracting foreign investment. We test the interactive effect of BITs and institutional strength in developing countries, and find supportive evidence that BITs substitute for judicial institutions in attracting investment—but solely on the intensive margin of investment.

Political Property Rights: Inequality and Growth Under Selective Rule of Law (book manuscript)

The Economic Costs of Favoritism (with Horacio Larreguy).

Economics, Politics, and the Rule of Law: An Experiment in Formalization (with Jessica Gottlieb).

Who Controls Private-Sector Development? Bureaucratic Origins and Preferential Access to Economic Growth.